ST. GEORGE TUCKER’S SECOND AMENDMENT:
DECONSTRUCTING “THE TRUE PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY”
Stephen P. Halbrook1
A bill of rights may be considered, not only as intended to give law, and
assign limits to a government about to be established, but as giving
information to the people. By reducing speculative truths to fundamental
laws, every man of the meanest capacity and understanding may learn his
own rights, and know when they are violated . . . .
– St. George Tucker2
Introduction
The Bill of Rights, according to the above view, is designed to inform ordinary
citizens of their rights. Its meaning is not a monopoly of the governmental entities whose
powers it was intended to limit. By knowing when one’s rights are violated, the citizen
may signify his or her displeasure through mechanisms such as the ballot box and the
jury box, and may resort to speech, the press, assembly, and petition to denounce the evil.
The Second Amendment “right of the people to keep and bear arms”3 was intended to
serve as the ultimate check which the Founders hoped would dissuade persons at the
helm of state from seeking to establish tyranny.4
1

Attorney at Law, Fairfax, Va.; Ph.D. Florida State University, J.D. Georgetown
University; former philosophy professor, Tuskegee University, Howard University,
George Mason University.
Books include The Founders’ Second Amendment
(forthcoming); That Every Man Be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional Right
(1984, 2000); A Right to Bear Arms: State & Federal Bills of Rights & Constitutional
Guarantees (1989); Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, & the Right to Bear Arms
(1998); Firearms Law Deskbook (2006). Argued Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997), and other Supreme Court cases. See further www.stephenhalbrook.com. Error!
Main Document Only.© Copyright 2006 by Stephen P. Halbrook. All rights reserved.
2

St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 ST.
GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ed. app. at 308 (William Young Birch & Abraham
Small, 1803) [hereafter Tucker, View of the Constitution].
3

“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const., Amend. II.
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This view was expressed just ten days after Madison proposed the Bill of Rights
in Congress:
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before them, may
attempt to tyrannize, and as the military forces which must be occasionally
raised to defend our country, might pervert their power to the injury of
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While humble people generally think that they are among “the people,” a segment
of the not-so-humble appear to disagree when it comes to the right of “the people” to
keep and bear arms.5 Did the Founders mean what they seem to have said, or were their
words too complex for the common people to understand? The following seeks to
provide some insights into that question through an examination of the writings of St.
George Tucker and a recent reevaluation of those writings.
When Thomas Jefferson was elected as President of the United States in 1801,
students from the College of William and Mary celebrated with a glass of wine at the
house of their acclaimed professor, Judge St. George Tucker.6 Tucker was already at
work writing what would be the first and foremost treatise on the Constitution and Bill of
Rights. Published in 1803 and known as Tucker’s Blackstone, the work included the
English jurist’s Commentaries along with Tucker’s reflections on the American system.7
During the American Revolution, Tucker had smuggled in arms from the West
Indies at the behest of Governor Patrick Henry,8 and as a militia colonel fought against
British forces.9 After the war, Tucker practiced law. Tucker, along with James Madison
their fellow-citizens, the people are confirmed by the next article in their
right to keep and bear their private arms.
A Pennsylvanian [Tench Coxe], “Remarks on the First Part of the Amendments to the
Federal Constitution,” Federal Gazette, June 18, 1789, at 2, col. 1. See S. Halbrook & D.
Kopel, “Tench Coxe and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 1787-1823,” 7 William &
Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Issue 2, 347, 367 (Feb. 1999).
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Constitution (The Hearst Corp. 1987), at 27 (emphasis added).
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(Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1938), 127.
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Tucker’s Appendix, “the first disquisition upon the character and interpretation
of the Federal Constitution, as well as upon its origin and true nature,” was for years used
as a textbook in Virginia and other states in the early republic. J. Randolph Tucker, The
Judges Tucker of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1 Va. L. Reg. 789, 793-94 (1896). See
Stephen P. Halbrook, “St. George Tucker: The American Blackstone,” 32 Virginia Bar
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In 1775, Tucker had heard Patrick Henry’s famous “Liberty or Death” speech,
and left one of only two detailed accounts of that debate. Tyler Moses, Patrick Henry,
l37 (1887, reprinted New York, 1980).
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Coleman, St. George Tucker, supra note 6, at 35, 48-58. Tucker was appointed
major of the Chesterfield militia, which he led to join General Greene in North Carolina.
With sword and pistol, he dashed about on his horse Hob at the Battle of Guilford Court
House, rallying the wavering militiamen and taking a bayonet wound in the leg. Tucker
would be promoted to lieutenant colonel of a troop of horsemen in the Virginia militia,
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and Edmund Randolph, was appointed to the Annapolis Convention of 1786, a warmup
for the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which framed the federal Constitution.
However, Tucker was known to have joined with George Mason and Patrick Henry in
opposing its adoption without a bill of rights.10 In l788, as the States debated the
proposed federal constitution, Tucker was appointed judge of the General Court of
Virginia. After serving in the Court of Appeals of Virginia,11 in 1813 he was appointed
by President James Madison as U.S. District Judge for the District of Virginia.12
In 2006, the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William and Mary College of
Law held a symposium on the influence of St. George Tucker on American law.13
Professor Saul Cornell of Ohio State University presented a paper on Tucker’s views on
the right to bear arms.14 As Cornell notes, “St. George Tucker described the Second
Amendment as ‘the true palladium of liberty.’”15
As the first major commentator on the Constitution, Tucker’s views should be
accorded close scrutiny,16 particularly on an issue like the Second Amendment, which has
received little attention by the Supreme Court.17 Professor Cornell has emerged as
and was actively involved in the siege of Yorktown when Cornwallis surrendered.
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Saul Cornell, “St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original
Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings,” 47 W. & M. L. Rev. 1123 (Feb. 2006)
[hereafter Cornell, “St. George Tucker.”].
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“Our most recent treatment of the Second Amendment occurred in United States
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 83 L. Ed. 1206, 59 S. Ct. 816 (1939) . . . . The Court did not,
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perhaps the leading exponent of the view that the Second Amendment recognizes no
individual right to possess arms, and instead protects a civic duty to bear arms in the
militia.18 Accordingly, an analysis of Tucker’s views on the issue reveals much of
importance on the Second Amendment, and an analysis of Cornell’s views on Tucker
may well reveal much about the position that the Amendment eschews any individual
right.
In his article, Cornell seeks to refute “supporters of gun rights” who misinterpret
Tucker as espousing that “the right to bear arms was originally understood to protect an
individual right to keep and use firearms for personal self-defense, hunting, and any other
lawful activity.”19 Referring to the controversy over “gun rights and gun control,”
Cornell avers: “The individual rights misreading of Tucker is merely the latest example
of how constitutional scholarship has been hijacked for ideological purposes in this bitter
debate.”20
I. “THE PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY”:
TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE VERSUS CORNELL’S TUCKER
Debunking the individual-rights “hijackers” of the Second Amendment, Professor
Cornell refers to “the often-quoted passage describing it [the Second Amendment] as the
‘palladium of liberty’” at least five times,21 but strangely fails to provide the actual
quotation or to acknowledge its contents. It would be worthwhile to do so at the outset in
order to determine the extent of the constitutional hijacking by scholars who read the
Second Amendment as protecting individual rights.
After quoting the text of the Amendment, Tucker began as follows:

bear their own firearms”), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002), with Silveira v. Lockyer,
312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (adopting “the ‘collective rights’ model, [which]
asserts that the Second Amendment right to ‘bear arms’ guarantees the right of the people
to maintain effective state militias, but does not provide any type of individual right to
own or possess weapons.”), pet. for reh. denied, 328 F.3d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003).
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This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty. . . . The right of
self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the
study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible.
Wherever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep
and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited,
liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.22
Cornell’s thesis is that Tucker, along with the Founders in general, saw the
Second Amendment as guaranteeing a “state right” to maintain a militia, excluding an
individual right to have and carry arms for self defense, which the legislature is free to
curtail or prohibit. Yet Tucker’s comment clearly espouses the view that the Second
Amendment protects the individual right to bear arms and to use them for self defense –
“the first law of nature.”
The militia was not mentioned in the above quotation, although Tucker certainly
saw the militia as the republican alternative to a standing army. After all, the right to
arms for defense extended to protection from both individual criminals and public
tyranny.
Moreover, as noted, Tucker saw any prohibition on the right “under any colour or
pretext whatsoever” as dangerous to liberty. He proceeded to explain further:
In England, the people have been disarmed, generally, under the specious
pretext of preserving the game: a never failing lure to bring over the
landed aristocracy to support any measure, under that mask, though
calculated for very different purposes. True it is, their bill of rights seems
at first view to counteract this policy: but the right of bearing arms is
confined to protestants, and the words suitable to their condition and
degree, have been interpreted to authorise the prohibition of keeping a gun
or other engine for the destruction of game, to any farmer, or inferior
tradesman, or other person not qualified to kill game. So that not one man
in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject to a
penalty.23
22
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Id. at 297. The above was quoted in the seminal case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Black
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Thus, when explaining how the right to keep and bear arms was violated in
England, Tucker pointed in part to English game laws which prohibited individuals from
keeping guns, even at home.24 He said nothing about any laws which disarmed militias.
This is inconsistent with Cornell’s thesis that the right to bear arms protects only militias
from being disarmed.
Tucker also referred above to the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, which
stated: “That the Subjects which are Protestants, may have Arms for their Defense
suitable to their Condition, and as are allowed by Law.”25 This was a right of Protestant
“Subjects” – not militiamen – to “have Arms for their Defense,” and Tucker referred to
this above as the English variety of “the right of bearing arms” without imposing any
militia context.
Blackstone had written that “a reason oftener meant, than avowed, by the makers
of forest or game laws” was “for preventing of popular insurrections and resistance to the
government, by disarming the bulk of the people.”26 Historically, conquerors who
founded the European kingdoms endeavored “to keep the rustici or natives of the country
. . . in as low a condition as possible, and especially to prohibit them the use of arms.
Nothing could do this more effectually than a prohibition of hunting and sporting . . . .”27
Feudal laws thus “prohibit[ed] the rustici in general from carrying arms” and severely
proscribed hunting.28
Commenting on Blackstone’s text, Tucker again juxtaposed the limited right to
have arms under the English Declaration with the game laws. “In the construction of
these game laws it seems to be held, that no person who is not qualified according to law
to kill game, hath any right to keep a gun in his house.”29 Since only persons with an
income of 100 pounds per annum were qualified to hunt, “it follows that no others can
keep a gun for their defense; so that the whole nation are completely disarmed, and left at
the mercy of the government, under the pretext of preserving the breed of hares and
partridges, for the exclusive use of the independent country gentlemen.”30 Tucker
24
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concluded: “In America we may reasonably hope that the people will never cease to
regard the right of keeping and bearing arms as the surest pledge of their liberty.”31
Again, Tucker discussed the right to keep and bear arms as protecting the liberty
to keep a gun for defense in the home and to carry arms, including for hunting. No
mention was made of state militia powers or bearing arms in a militia. Cornell disregards
the above passages altogether.
While declining to quote the words of Tucker’s “palladium of liberty” text,
Cornell notes that Justice Joseph Story used the same allegory in his Commentaries on
the Constitution. Cornell states: “While individual rights scholars have often cited Story
in modern Second Amendment scholarship, they have studiously avoided examining his
own analysis of the original understanding of the Second Amendment.”32 Cornell
proceeds to quote a comment by Story regarding Congress’ militia power being
“concurrent with that of the states.”33
As with Tucker, Cornell studiously avoids mention of the content of Story’s
analysis of the Second Amendment, much less does he quote any of Story’s “palladium
of liberty” statement. Story’s interpretation is unmistakable:
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered,
as the palladium of the liberties of the republic; since it offers a strong
moral check against usurpation and arbitrary power of the rulers; and will
generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the
people to resist and triumph over them.34
Story cited Tucker for that proposition as well as for the following about the right
of subjects “to have arms for their defense” under the English Declaration of Rights: “But
under various pretenses the effect of this provision has been greatly narrowed; and it is at
present in England more nominal than real, as a defensive privilege.”35 Story was
referring to possession of arms by individuals, not by militias. While Story also stressed
the importance of a well regulated militia, that was hardly inconsistent with the individual
right to have arms.36
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Elsewhere Story fused the individual right with the need for a militia quite
neatly as follows: “One of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish their
purposes without resistance, is, by disarming the people, and making it an offence to keep
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Having left the reader in the dark about what Tucker and Story actually said on
“the palladium of liberty,” Cornell asserts that for both: “Protection of states’ rights, not
individual rights, was the issue that had prompted the inclusion of the Second
Amendment.”37 Aside from the constitutional vocabulary that governments (federal and
State) have only “powers” and not “rights,” and that only individuals have “rights,”38 the
Second Amendment was prompted by the perceived need to protect the right of
individuals to keep and bear arms, which would encourage a well regulated militia.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ARMS FOR SELF DEFENSE?
Blackstone’s Commentaries analyzed the right to have arms in the first chapter,
entitled “Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals,” of the first book, entitled “Of the Rights
of Persons.” Therein he referred to “auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which
serve principally as outworks or barriers, to protect and maintain inviolate the three great
and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”39
Besides the right to petition, Blackstone included among these auxiliary rights the
following:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subjects, that I shall at present
mention, is that of having arms for their defence suitable to their condition
and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the
same statute 1 W. & M. st.2 c.2 [the Declaration of Rights], and it is
indeed, a public allowance under due restrictions, of the natural right of
resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws
are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.40
To the above, Tucker counterposed the following: “The right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 4, and this
without any qualification as to their condition or degree, as is the case in the British
government.”41 Cornell refers to this statement of Tucker, but fails to quote it, and

arms, and by substituting a regular army in the stead of a resort to the militia.” Story, A
Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Harper, 1859,
reprint Regnery 1986), § 450, at 319.
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asserts that it does “not address the question of individual self defense.”42 Yet the
discussion concerns a “right of the subjects” to use arms for “self-preservation” when the
law is inadequate, and no mention is made of the militia. Indeed, Tucker added the
following further note to Blackstone’s above words:
Whoever examines the forest, and game laws in the British code, will
readily perceive that the right of keeping arms is effectually taken away
from the people of England. The commentator himself informs us, Vol. II,
p. 412, “that the prevention of popular insurrections and resistence to
government by disarming the bulk of the people, is a reason oftener meant
than avowed by the makers of the forest and game laws.”43
Again, the forest and game laws repressed the right of individuals to keep arms, in
order to enable the ruling monarchy to control the commoners. Such laws had no
applicability to “State’s rights” to maintain a militia – indeed, England had no States – or
to bearing arms in a militia. Tucker clearly saw the Second Amendment as prohibiting
infringements on the individual right to have arms.
Contending that the right to have arms in the English Declaration had no selfdefense component, Cornell argues that this auxiliary right, “‘the right to have arms,’ was
aimed at preventing the violence of oppression, not defending oneself against thieves.”44
But Blackstone made no distinction between defense against robbers or tyrants, nor did
he limit defense to organized groups and exclude individual defense. Indeed, the right of
having arms vindicated the rights to “personal security” and “personal liberty.” As
Blackstone further explained:
In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently
termed, the liberties of Englishmen. . . . And, lastly, to vindicate these
rights, when actually violated or attacked, the subjects of England are
entitled, in the first place, to the regular administration and free course of
justice in the courts of law; next, to the right of petitioning the king and
parliament for redress of grievances; and, lastly, to the right of having and
using arms for self-preservation and defense.45
Use of arms “for self-preservation and defense” could be individual or in a group,
large or small. An aggressor could be a single murderer or a renegade military force that
stages a coup d’ état and overthrew the constitution. Contrary to Cornell, Blackstone did
not limit self-preservation to some kind of elusive collective right and eschew individual
defense.
Tucker made further references to infringement of the individual right to bear
arms which Cornell fails to mention. Tucker explained how the British Parliament would
violate basic rights in the guise of some necessary objective, but that Congress had no
such power. He reiterated that in England the game laws “have been converted into the
42
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means of disarming the body of the people,” and that “the acts directing the mode of
petitioning parliament, and those for prohibiting riots: and for suppressing assemblies of
free-masons, are so many ways for preventing public meetings of the people to deliberate
upon the public, or national concerns.” By contrast, Congress had “no power to regulate,
or interfere with the domestic concerns, or police of any state,” “nor will the constitution
permit any prohibition of arms to the people; or of peaceable assemblies by them for the
purposes whatsoever, and in any number, whenever they may see occasion.”46
In short, the Bill of Rights precluded “any” ban on arms “to the people” or of their
peaceable assemblies. Tucker wrote “the people,” not “the militia,” and he obviously had
in mind the rights protected by the First and Second Amendments.
The pattern is pervasive. Cornell argues that Tucker, in his discussion of the law
of treason, sharply contrasted “the common law right to keep or carry firearms and the
constitutional right to bear arms” in a militia.47 Regarding the law of treason in England,
Sir Matthew Hale observed in Pleas of the Crown that “the very use of weapons by such
an assembly, without the king’s licence, unless in some lawful and special cases, carries a
terror with it, and a presumption of warlike force, &c.”48 Tucker commented that “the
bare circumstance of having arms, therefore, of itself, creates a presumption of warlike
force in England, and may be given in evidence there, to prove quo animo the people are
assembled.”49 Cornell acknowledges that statement, but then avoids any reference to
what Tucker proceeded to ask:
But ought that circumstance of itself, to create any such presumption in
America, where the right to bear arms is recognized and secured in the
constitution itself? In many parts of the United States, a man no more
thinks, of going out of his house on any occasion, without his rifle or
musket in his hand, than an European fine gentleman without his sword by
his side.50
As usual, Cornell avoids the embarrassing quotations. As an example of exercise
of “the right to bear arms” as “secured in the constitution,” Tucker referred to a man
“going out of his house on any occasion” – not just for a militia muster – with “his rifle
or musket in his hand.” Cornell’s veiled reference to the above two sentences revises
them to say that, in Tucker’s view, “the mere fact of traveling armed with a musket did
not by itself create any presumption of illegality.”51
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Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 315-16.
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Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1147.
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St. George Tucker, Concerning Treason, in 5 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES, ed. app. at 19.
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Cornell intersperses with the above a discussion of the prosecutions arising out of
the Whisky and Fries rebellions. Cornell states: “The defense and prosecution in the
resulting cases conceded that traveling armed with militia weapons did not enjoy
constitutional protection when those weapons were used outside of the context of militiarelated activity.”52 He cites a trio of reported cases for that proposition, but nothing in
these cases remotely makes any such suggestion. In one case, the Attorney General did
argue the unremarkable proposition that “to assemble in a body, armed and arrayed, for
some treasonable purpose, is an act of levying war.”53 But no one mentioned the
constitutional status of traveling with militia arms, whether when on duty or not.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW: INVALIDATING INFRINGEMENTS ON
LIBERTY OR DICTATING TO THE MILITARY COMMAND?
Cornell’s rendition of Tucker is long on Cornell’s characterizations and citations
to recent law review articles supporting the “collective rights” view of the Second
Amendment, but woefully short on Tucker’s actual words. This pattern also arises
regarding Tucker’s views on judicial review. Cornell claims that Tucker conjured up a
scenario of “federal disarmament of the militia” in a discussion about whether courts
could declare laws unconstitutional.54
Tucker made no such mention about the militia. In the reference cited by Cornell,
Tucker contended that judicial review is particularly applicable to laws purportedly
passed not under an enumerated power, but under the “necessary and proper” clause, and
which violated Bill of Rights guarantees. A court may declare a federal criminal law
unconstitutional in that circumstance:
If, for example, congress were to pass a law prohibiting any person from
bearing arms, as a means of preventing insurrections, the judicial courts,
under the construction of the words necessary and proper, here contended
for, would be able to pronounce decidedly upon the constitutionality of
these means. But if congress may use any means, which they choose to
adopt, the provision in the constitution which secures to the people the
right of bearing arms, is a mere nullity; and any man imprisoned for
bearing arms under such an act, might be without relief; because in that
case, no court could have any power to pronounce on the necessity or
propriety of the means adopted by congress to carry any specified power
into complete effect.55
52

Id. at 1148 n.150, citing United States v. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515 (1799);
United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348 (1795); United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 346 (1795).
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Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1138, citing Tucker, View of the
Constitution, supra note 2, at 289.
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Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 289. Tucker adhered to the
then-incipient view that the courts are duty bound to declare statutes contrary to the
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Tucker referred above to a law prohibiting “any person” – not a militia – from
bearing arms. Judicial review would be initiated by “any man” imprisoned for bearing
arms, not by a State claiming federal usurpation of its militia power or an individual
claiming rejection by a militia force. In short, the Second Amendment protected
individuals from federal laws which would prohibit possession of arms and impose
imprisonment for having arms.
Tucker expanded on this analysis of judicial protection for the right to keep and
bear arms in a further passage. Cornell refers to the page number, but neither quotes the
passage nor summarizes its content.56 Tucker wrote:
If, for example, a law be passed by congress, prohibiting the free
exercise of religion, according to the dictates, or persuasions of a man’s
own conscience; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people to assemble peaceably, or to keep and bear arms; it
would, in any of these cases be the province of the judiciary to pronounce
whether any such act were constitutional, or not; and if not, to acquit the
accused from any penalty which might be annexed to the breach of such
unconstitutional act. . . . The judiciary, therefore, is that department of the
government to whom the protection of the rights of the individual is by the
constitution especially confided, interposing its shield between him and
the sword of usurped authority, the darts of oppression, and the shafts of
faction and violence.57
The right to have arms, under the above view, was on a par with freedom of
religion, speech, and assembly, and abridgment of any of these rights should be declared
unconstitutional. The judiciary had a special responsibility to protect these “rights of the
individual.”
Yet Cornell, who refuses to quote the relevant passages, refers to “The modern
individual rights misreading of Tucker,” and asserts: “The danger that Tucker
apprehended was federal disarmament of the state militias.”58 He adds: “If Federalists
tried to restrict the right to bear arms in the militia, Tucker believed that federal courts
should strike down such laws as unconstitutional.”59 Yet Tucker never mentioned the
militia in the above passages, not even once.
constitution as void. In a General Court case decided in 1793, Judge Tucker opined that
the Virginia Constitution of 1776, being the sovereign act of the people and hence the
supreme law, “is a rule to all departments of the government, to the judiciary as well as to
the legislature . . . .” Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cases 20, *23 (1793). Chief Justice John
Marshall would espouse that view in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( l Cranch) 137 (1803).
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57
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As for the alleged “right to bear arms in the militia,” those conscripted into the
militia apparently have a “right” to do that which they are ordered to do on pain of fines
or imprisonment. It is a rather curious “right” to do something one is forced to do. As
for those who are not conscripted into the militia, they have an even more radical “right”
to be so conscripted.
Specifically, based on the same passage from Tucker quoted above, Cornell
asserts that, to Tucker, “the right to bear arms in a well-regulated militia was a judicially
enforceable privilege and immunity of federal citizenship.”60 Aside from the fact that
Tucker did not say or even imply that, the implications of this statement are astonishing.
It suggests that a person who is not a member of a militia could file a federal lawsuit and
obtain a judicial decree ordering those in authority to accept such person as a militia
member, and further ordering that such person be able to bear arms. Could such person
also choose which arm he or she would like to bear, as well as decide where and when to
do so? Such a doctrine is inconsistent with the fundamental concept of compelled
enrollment into a military force and its system of command.
Tucker himself noted that the 1792 Militia Act “establishing an uniform militia
throughout the United States, seems to have excluded all but free white men from bearing
arms in the militia.”61 Indeed, the Act provided in part that “each and every free ablebodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of
the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after
excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia by the captain or
60

Id. at 1126, citing Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 356-57.
Cornell claims that this view was adopted by Republicans in the Department of Justice
during Reconstruction, but only cites two works supportive of the view that
Reconstruction Republicans held the Second Amendment to be a right of individuals,
including freed slaves, which was incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 257-66
(1998); Stephen P. Halbrook, Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right to
Bear Arms, 1866-1876 viii (1998). The Department pursued criminal indictments in
federal courts alleging that the individual rights of freedmen to assemble and to have
arms under the First and Second Amendments were violated by private conspirators. See
Halbrook, Freedmen, chapters 6-7.
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St. George Tucker, On the State of Slavery in Virginia, in 2 ST. GEORGE
TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, ed. app. at 37 n. [Hereafter Tucker, On the
State of Slavery in Virginia.] Elsewhere, Tucker summarized the militia law in part as
follows:
Every able bodied white male citizen of the respective states, of the age of
eighteen, and under forty-five years of age (except certain persons
particularly excepted, and all persons who now are, or may be excepted by
the laws of the respective states) shall be enrolled in the militia: and every
person so enrolled shall, within six months, provide himself with arms,
&c. as directed by the act, and shall appear so armed, &c. when called out
to exercise, or into service.
2 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, 409 n.
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commanding officer of the company, within whose bounds such citizen shall reside . . .
.”62 Even within that limited class, various occupations, from government officials to
persons involved in crucial transportation services, were exempt from the militia.63
According to the Cornell thesis, the persons not qualified by law to be in the
militia by reason of age, sex, race, occupation, not being able-bodied, or simply not being
needed had a judicially-enforceable right under the Second Amendment to enlist in the
militia so that they could “bear arms.” The above statutory limitations presumably
should have been declared unconstitutional by the courts.
Moreover, the Act also required every person enrolled in the militia to “provide
himself with a good musket or firelock” and other equipment, and required him to
“appear, so armed, accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise, or into service . .
. .”64 Yet under the Cornellian constitutional right to bear arms in the militia, one not
called out to exercise or into service would have a judicially-enforceable right to be
called out. Such person would also presumably have the right to decide what kind of
arms to bear, even if contrary to what the law and the militia command prescribes.
In short, Cornell is so intent on deconstructing the ordinary reading of the Second
Amendment – that the people have a right to keep and bear arms – that he conjures up the
unprecedented fantasy that a federal court could dictate to military authorities, including
the personnel of a militia force together with their functions and arms. Reality was and
remains otherwise. A militiaman’s refusal to peel potatoes when so commanded because
he felt entitled to “bear arms” would be insubordination, not exercise of a constitutional
right, and could lead to a court-martial.
Tucker’s views as expressed in his edition of Blackstone were originally
formulated in Tucker’s law lectures presented at the William and Mary College of Law.
These lectures, according to Cornell, do “not support the individual rights view,” for
Tucker “explicitly described the Second Amendment as a right of the states . . . .”65 For
once, Cornell presents an actual quotation from Tucker, instead of the usual snippet or
failure to quote anything. In this quotation, Tucker states that a State may choose “to
incur the expence of putting arms into the Hands of its own Citizens for their defense,”
and that would not contravene federal authority.66 To “contend that such a power would
be dangerous” – on the basis that federal law might be resisted or withdrawal from the
Union might occur – “would be subversive of every principle of Freedom in our
Government.” Tucker added that this was the view of the first federal Congress, since it
proposed what became the Second Amendment, which Tucker quotes. “To this we may
62
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add that this power of arming the militia, is not one of those prohibited to the States by
the Constitution, and, consequently, is reserved to them under the [Tenth
Amendment].”67
This statement is consistent with both the power of the state to arm its citizens –
which is implied in both the Militia Clause of the Second Amendment and in the reserved
powers guarantee of the Tenth Amendment – and the right of the citizens to keep and
bear such arms – which is explicit in the Second Amendment’s operative clause. In
short, the States had a reserved power to arm the militia, and this did not violate any
power delegated to the federal government. Contrary to Cornell, Tucker did not assert
that the Second Amendment secures nothing more than a State militia power.
Tucker’s above views from his law lectures reappeared in his View of the
Constitution which was published as an appendix to his edition of Blackstone. The
subject was the Militia Power in Article I, § 8, of the Constitution, which delegates power
to Congress “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . . .”68
The objective of this provision, according to Tucker, could be traced to the
Virginia bill of rights, which declared “that a well-regulated militia, composed of the
body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state .
. . .”69 Tucker recalled the proposed amendment by the Virginia convention that ratified
the Constitution in 1788: “that each state respectively should have the power to provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining its own militia, whenever Congress shall omit or
neglect to provide for the same.”70 (As discussed below, that provision was rejected by
Congress when it considered amendments in 1789.) Any “uneasiness upon the subject,
seems to be completely removed,” Tucker continued, by the Second Amendment. “To
which we may add, that the power of arming the militia, not being prohibited to the
states, respectively, by the constitution, is, consequently, reserved to them, concurrently
with the federal government.”71
67

Id. Indeed, the Constitution was clear when it prohibited military powers to the
States. E.g., Art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . keep Troops . . . in time of Peace”).
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Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 272-73, quoting Virginia
Declaration of Rights, Art. XIII (1776).
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Id. at 273. See J. Elliot ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, vol. 3, at 660.
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Id. The focus of Tucker’s discussion was the Militia Power, not the Second
Amendment, which was mentioned only once. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra
note 2, at 272-75. Cornell cites these same pages and claims: “This discussion of the
Second Amendment clearly frames the issue in terms of the militia.” Cornell, “St.
George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1138.
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The above was consistent with Tucker’s other comments in the View on the
Second Amendment. Recognition of the right of the people to have arms promoted a
well regulated militia. Contrary to Cornell, the two concepts are hardly irreconcilable.
As noted above, the Virginia convention proposed a state power to provide for the
militia should Congress neglect to do so. This was among the structural amendments
concerning federal and State powers that the convention proposed. Virginia also
proposed an entirely separate list of “unalienable rights,” including “that the people have
a right to freedom of speech,” and “that the people have a right to keep and bear arms;
that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the
proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state . . . .”72
When the first federal Congress considered amendments to the Constitution, the
proposed bill of rights was considered separately from the structural amendments. The
Senate passed provisions which would become the First and Second Amendments,
rejecting inclusion of an anti-standing army provision in the latter.73 St. George Tucker
was informed of these Senate proceedings.74
The Senate considered separately, and rejected, all structural amendments to the
Constitution, including the Virginia proposal: “That each state, respectively, shall have
the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining its own militia, whensoever
Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same . . . .”75 The linguistic differences
are unmistakable: this posited the “power” of the “state” to organize, arm, and discipline
its militia, in contrast with the “right” of “the people” to keep and bear arms.
John Randolph wrote to St. George Tucker about the Senate action as follows: “A
majority of the Senate were for not allowing the militia arms & if two thirds had agreed it
would have been an amendment to the Constitution. They are afraid that the Citizens will
stop their full career to Tyranny & Oppression.”76
Cornell, without any reference to the Senate’s consideration of the amendment
regarding the State militia power, mistakes Randolph’s letter as concerning the Second
Amendment, and asserts: “As Randolph’s letter to Tucker suggests, the issue before the
Senate was control of the militia, not an individual right to use guns for personal defense
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Elliot ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
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Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United States of America
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or hunting.”77 Yet the Senate passed the individual right to have arms and rejected the
state power to maintain militia. It cannot be the case that, by declaring the right of the
people to keep and bear arms, Congress actually intended to declare the power of States
to maintain militias – the very proposal Congress rejected.
The Senate then returned to the bill of rights, passing a form of the First
Amendment similar to the final version, and rejecting a proposal to add “for the common
defence” after “bear arms” in the Second Amendment.78 Had it succeeded, recognition of
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms for the common defense” would have still
guaranteed an individual right to keep arms, but could have been interpreted as allowing
arms to be borne only for the common defense.
Cornell denies that the Senate’s rejection of the words “bear arms for the common
defense” “establishes that they intended to protect an individual right,” claiming that
“Randolph’s letter casts the choice to excise this language in a radically different light.”79
To the contrary, Senate action on the Second Amendment was entirely separate from its
action on the State militia power, which was the subject of Randolph’s letter.80
IV. THE LINGUISTICS OF “BEARING ARMS”:
DOES “BEAR” MEAN CARRY, AND DO “ARMS” INCLUDE HANDGUNS?
Under Tucker’s above linguistic usage, the term “bear arms” simply means to
carry a weapon, whether for defense, hunting, militia purposes, or other reasons.
However, Cornell argues that “bear arms” had an almost exclusively military usage.81
The evidence for this argument is underwhelming.
The first state bill of rights to use the terms “bear arms” was that of Pennsylvania
in 1776, which stated: “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of
themselves, and the state . . . .”82 Cornell denies that such language denotes an individual
77
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[to bear a gun in self-defense] into state bills of rights during the Founding Era, but those
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right, since it did not refer to the singular “right to bear arms in defense of himself and
the State,” as did one or more state bills of rights in the nineteenth century.83 Yet
“defense of themselves” meant self defense, or otherwise it would redundantly mean
defense of “the state.”
Moreover, Pennsylvania kept that same clause in a 1790 revision as follows:
“That the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not
be questioned.”84 James Wilson, president of the convention which adopted that
provision, a leading Federalist, and later Supreme Court Justice, explained it in a
discussion of homicide “when it is necessary for the defence of one’s person or house.”85
He continued:
it is the great natural law of self preservation, which, as we have seen,
cannot be repealed, or superseded, or suspended by any human institution.
This law, however, is expressly recognised in the constitution of
Pennsylvania. “The right of the citizens to bear arms in the defence of
themselves shall not be questioned.” This is one of our many renewals of
the Saxon regulations. “They were bound,” says Mr. Selden, “to keep
arms for the preservation of the kingdom, and of their own persons.”86
Cornell argues that only “isolated examples” exist of the terms “bear arms” being
used in an individual, non-military sense, “an idiosyncratic text such as the Dissent of the
Pennsylvania Minority” being one example.87 That was a proposal by Anti-Federalists in
the Pennsylvania convention that ratified the Constitution in 1787 for a bill of rights,
including the following:
efforts inevitably failed.” Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1144. His only
example is that the Virginia Declaration of Rights did not include Jefferson’s proposal
that “No freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms . . . .” Thomas Jefferson, The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Julian P. Boyd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1950), vol. 1, at 344-45. Actually, none of Jefferson’s draft bill of rights was
included.
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That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves
and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing
game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them,
unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from
individuals . . . .88
When the Bill of Rights was being debated in the House of Representatives in
1789, Rep. Frederick A. Muhlenberg, then the Speaker of the House who had also been
president of the Pennsylvania ratification convention, wrote that “it takes in the principal
Amendments which our Minority had so much at Heart . . . .”89 The Second Amendment
was merely a more concise version of the above, sans its laundry list of purposes and
exceptions.
Cornell cites no proposed or adopted constitutional guarantee which limited the
terms “bear arms” as a “right” to purely military use. He refers to a game bill which
Jefferson drafted and Madison proposed to the Virginia legislature in 1785.90 The bill
provided for deer hunting seasons outside one’s enclosed land, punishing a violator with
a fine and being bound to his good behavior. If within a year “he shall bear a gun out of
his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing military duty,” the defendant would be in
violation of his recognizance.91 Since this refers to “bear[ing]” an arm when deer hunting
or otherwise not on military duty, Cornell’s claim that “this text undermines the claims of
individual rights theorists” is difficult to understand.
While ignoring Tucker’s repeated use of “bear arms” above to refer to individual
use, Cornell points to Tucker’s work on slavery to show that “the term ‘bear arms’ was a
legal term of art that clearly implied the use of arms in a public capacity, not a private
one.”92 Writing in 1796, Tucker noted that free Negroes “were formerly incapable of
serving in the militia, except as drummers or pioneers, but now I presume they are
enrolled in the lists of those that bear arms, though formerly punishable for presuming to
appear at a muster-field.”93 Tucker republished his essay on slavery in the Commentaries
with new notations, including the following in regard to the comment that free blacks
were enrolled in the militia: “This was the case under the laws of the state; but the act of
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2 Cong. c. 33, for establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States, seems to
have excluded all but free white men from bearing arms in the militia.”94
Despite the military assistance of free blacks and even slaves in the Revolution,
they were deprived of civil rights, such as: “All but housekeepers, and persons residing
upon the frontiers are prohibited from keeping, or carrying any gun, powder, shot, club,
or other weapon offensive or defensive.”95
Tucker referred above to free blacks who were enrolled on the militia lists to
“bear arms” as well as the later exclusion of all but whites “from bearing arms in the
militia.” In neither instance did he limit the terms “bear arms” to militia service, and in
the latter saw a need to specify that the bearing of arms was “in the militia.” Tucker used
the terms in the broadest manner in his plan for the emancipation of slaves, in which he
proposed civil restrictions such as: “Let no Negroe or mulattoe be capable . . . of keeping,
or bearing arms, unless authorized to do by some act of the general assembly . . . .”96 He
explained that “by disarming them, we may calm our apprehensions of their resentments
arising from past sufferings.”97
Referring to the above prohibition on blacks “keeping, or bearing arms,” Cornell
claims: “According to Tucker’s analysis, blacks would be prohibited from keeping arms
in their home, or from appearing at muster and being issued arms they might bear as part
of the militia.”98 Yet Tucker said nothing about any militia muster or being issued arms –
the prohibition was on “bearing arms” in any form, which meant carrying arms in any
manner, just as under the slave codes.
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In explaining the term “bear arms,” Cornell not only constricts the word “bear” to
one narrow meaning, but also does the same with the word “arms.” Militia weapons such
as muskets were constitutionally protected (albeit limited to militia use), while “civilian
firearms,” “ordinary guns,” and “personal arms such as pistols” were not.99
However, pistols were indeed militia arms. Officers in troops of horse were
required by the 1792 Militia Act to “be armed with a sword and pair of pistols”100 Tucker
himself fought in battles in the Revolution as a militia officer armed with sword and
pistol.101 Not surprisingly, Cornell finds nothing to cite from Tucker to substantiate his
claim.
Instead, Cornell quotes from an anonymous letter to the editor writing on the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 to the effect that “the legislature have [sic] a power
to controul [arms] in all cases, except the one mentioned in the bill of rights . . . .”102
Cornell adds, implying that he is summarizing the author: “Personal arms such as pistols
were not treated in the same way as militia weapons such as muskets.”103 Yet the author
said absolutely nothing about that subject. “In the absence of any law prohibiting the
ownership or use of personal firearms” – Cornell’s words, not the author’s – “‘the people
still enjoy, and must continue so to do till the legislature shall think fit to interdict.’”104
Moreover, the context of the above was the Massachusetts Constitution, which
provided: “The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence.”105
The above author commented elsewhere: “All men . . . have, a right to keep and bear
arms for their common defense, to kill game, fowl, &c. . . . The [Massachusetts] Bill of
99

Id. at 1151.

100

Chap. 33, Hening, Statutes at Large, vol. 1, at 271, 272, sec. 4 (1792).

101

Halbrook, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 7, at 46-47.

102

Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, quoting “Scribble Scrabble,”
Cumberland Gazette (Portland, Maine), Dec. 8, 1786 (brackets added by Cornell).
103

Id.

104

Id., quoting “Scribble Scrabble,” Cumberland Gazette, Dec. 8, 1786. Another
author writing in the same newspaper noted: “The idea that Great Britain meant to take
away their arms, was fresh in the minds of the people; therefore in forming a new
government, they wisely guarded against it.” “Senex,” Cumberland Gazette (Portland,
Maine), Jan. 12, 1787. This contradicts Cornell’s thesis that pistols were not
constitutionally protected, since British General Thomas Gage confiscated pistols as well
as other firearms from the inhabitants of Boston. Richard Frothingham, History of the
Siege of Boston (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1903), 95 (“the people delivered to the
selectmen 1778 fire-arms, 634 pistols, 973 bayonets, and 38 blunderbusses”). In the
Declaration of Causes of Taking Up Arms of July 6, 1775, the Continental Congress
decried Gage’s seizure of the arms of the people of Boston. 2 Worthington Chauncey
Ford ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1779 (1905), at 151.
105

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Art. XVII (1780).

21

Rights secures to the people the use of arms in common defense; so that, if it be an
alienable right, one use of arms is secured to the people against any law of the
legislature.”106 The federal Second Amendment includes no limitation on the use of arms
to the common defense, a clause which – as discussed above – was explicitly rejected.
Running far afield of Tucker, Cornell also references an 1837 Georgia law
prohibiting sale and possession of pistols.107 He neglects to mention that the Georgia
Supreme Court declared that law unconstitutional under the Second Amendment,
explaining:
The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and
not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description, and not such
merely as are used by the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed or
broken in upon, in the smallest degree; and all this for the important end to
be attained: the rearing up and qualifying a well-regulated militia, so
vitally necessary to the security of a free State. Our opinion is, that any
law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the Constitution, and void, which
contravenes this right.108
That interpretation is consistent with Tucker’s remark that liberty is endangered
where “the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever,
prohibited . . . .”109 And aside from the fact that pistols were militia arms, Tucker’s
statements against the English game laws demonstrate that firearms in general, including
hunting arms, were constitutionally protected. Tucker contrasted the rights of Americans
under the Second Amendment with England, where “the people have been disarmed,
generally,” so that “not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in his house . . . .”110
CONCLUSION
Cornell asserts about Tucker: “His writings fit neither the modern collective nor
individual rights models. In his more mature writings, Tucker thus approached the right
to bear arms as both a right of the states and as a civic right.”111 Aside from that not
being Tucker’s approach, that is the “collective rights” model. Denial that a “right” is
individual necessarily implies that it is “collective.” The ideas of a state “right” to bear
arms and of a person’s “civic right” to bear arms in the militia are two basic variants of
the collective rights model.
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Having turned Tucker completely on his head, Cornell expresses indignation
about scholars who read Tucker’s words in their literal and ordinary way:
Far too much scholarly energy has been wasted in the great American gun
debate trying to twist history to produce a usable past. While both sides in
this debate have played the law office history game on occasion, partisans
of the individual-rights view have been far more aggressive in pushing
their ideological agenda. . . . Reinterpreting the Second Amendment as an
individual right does more than simply distort history for ideological
purposes, it also does great violence to the text of the Constitution . . . .112
While Cornell is certainly correct in adding that one cannot just erase the Militia
Clause from the text, nor may one erase the substantive right. Those who deny that the
Amendment protects individual rights have failed to articulate any inconsistency between
recognition of the right of the populace to have arms and the resultant encouragement of
a militia.
The irony cannot be lost that Tucker, in his lectures at William and Mary College
of Law, explained the ramifications of the Second Amendment as an individual right in
detail, and that two centuries later, at the same College of Law, in a symposium dedicated
to Tucker’s legacy, Tucker’s views on the Second Amendment are obliterated. This is
accomplished by repeated veiled references to “the often-quoted passage describing it
[the Second Amendment] as the ‘palladium of liberty,’”113 without ever quoting that
passage or any of the other rich passages in which Tucker analyzed the broad character of
the right to keep and bear arms.
That brings us back to Tucker’s insight that a bill of rights is intended not only to
instruct government on its limits, but also to “giv[e] information to the people.” Every
person, even the most humble, thereby “may learn his own rights, and know when they
are violated.”114 Tucker synthesized the Founders’ aspirations in favor of a declaration of
rights that was more than a scrap of paper. This was the vision of the Founders as to
every provision of the Bill of Rights, not excluding the Second Amendment.
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